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A FAREWELL TO PENSION POLICY: THE IMPACT OF
FLEXIBLE IRAs ON CURRENT TAX POLICY
Regina T. Jefferson*
INTRODUCTION
Since the establishment of the income tax in 1913, there have been ex-
ceptions to the general rule of taxing all income as it is earned.1 Typically,
these exceptions attempt to encourage behavior that is believed to benefit
not only individual taxpayers but also society as a whole.2 Many critics of the
federal income tax system, however, maintain that most preferential tax
treatments disproportionately benefit wealthy Americans.3 Thus, some
policymakers contend that it is grossly inequitable for the federal government
to continue providing such tax benefits to the wealthiest Americans without
offering similar incentives to those with modest incomes.
4
Having an estimated cost of $64 billion for 1996, one of the country's
most expensive special tax programs is the private pension system.5 In addi-
tion to employer sponsored arrangements, the private pension system in-
cludes Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 6 which provide individual
© Some of the ideas in this Article appear in revised form in Regina T. Jefferson, The
American Dream Saving Account: Is It a Dream or a Nightmare?, in TAXING AMERICA (Karen
B. Brown & Mary L. Fellows eds., 1996).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University, Columbus School of Law. I gratefully
acknowledge Professor Daniel H. Halperin for his comments on an earlier draft. I also wish to
thank Peter Nikos Koufos and Elizabeth Diane Soscio for their extremely valuable research
assistance.
1. Section 61 generally defines gross income as "all income from whatever source derived."
I.R.C. § 61(a) (1996).
2. JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, STRUCTURE AND POLICY
244-46, 256-60 (1995). For example, excluding interest payments on debt issued by local and
state governments is designed to subsidize borrowing by state and local governments. Id. at 244-
46. The charitable contribution deduction encourages private sector charities which tend to pro-
vide public goods, and generate positive externalities which benefit society as a whole. Id. at
260.
3. See, e.g., Camilla E. Watson, Machiavelli and the Politics of Welfare, National Health, and
Old Age: A Comparative Perspective of the Policies of the United States and Canada, 1993 UTAH
L. REV. 1337, 1356.
4. See generally Regina T. Jefferson, The Earned Income Tax Credit: Thou Goest Whither?
A Critique of Existing Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 143,
143-45 (1995) (noting that EITC is designed to lessen overall regressivity within federal tax
system).
5. CELIA SILVERMAN ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., EBRI DATABOOK ON EM-
PLOYEE BENEFITS 19-23, tbl. 2-5 (Carolyn Pemberton & Deborah Holmes eds., 3d ed. 1995).
6. Individual Retirement Accounts ("IRAs") are technically not considered retirement
plans under I.R.C. § 401(a). See JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EM-
PLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 51 (2d ed. 1995). When defining the cost of the Private Pension system,
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workers with tax incentives to save for retirement. 7 An IRA can provide two
distinct tax benefits. First, under certain conditions, contributions made to an
IRA can be deducted from income.8 Second, the investment earnings on the
contributions made to an IRA are tax-free until distribution.9 By encourag-
ing individuals to save for retirement, two important social goals are accom-
plished: (1) taxpayers who ordinarily may not be able to save adequately for
retirement are encouraged to do so; and (2) aggregate individual savings in-
creases, creating greater national savings and investment capital for Ameri-
can economic growth. 10
Notwithstanding federal income tax incentives to foster retirement sav-
ings, the individual savings rate is declining in America." While it may not
be surprising that the savings rate among low-income individuals is negligi-
ble, it is surprising that the savings rate among middle-income individuals
also is dangerously low. 12 The accumulated savings of middle-income Amer-
icans is so low that unless saving patterns change significantly, the bulk of the
"baby boom" generation' 3 could experience retirement living standards
lower than those of today's retirees. 14
however, estimates generally include the tax expenditure for IRA's. See, e.g., SILVERMAN ET
AL., supra note 5, at 19-23, tbls. 2.4-2.5.
7. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., 3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974, pt. 1, at 3554 (Comm. Print 1976) (statement of Rep. Schneebeli) (noting that IRA
"allows the fellow who ... is not covered by a Pension Plan to contribute ... to a retirement
account and receive a deduction for it"); id. at 4809; JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION
AND ANALYSIS OF TAX PROPOSALS RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL SAVINGS, JCS-3-95, at 2-6 (1995).
8. I.R.C. § 219 (1996). The maximum amount allowed to be deducted is the lesser of $2,000
or the amount of compensation received. Id. § 219(b)(1).
9. Id. § 219(e)(1).
10. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 7, at 59-65 (noting that IRAs will help
middle- and lower-income individuals to save for their retirement while increasing savings rate);
Bruce E. Thompson, Jr., Time to Tackle Our Savings Deficit, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A19.
America's national savings rate is the lowest in the first world. This "savings deficit" contributes
to a lack of domestic investment capital in the U.S. economy. Investment capital is essential for
economic growth and prosperity. More savings means more money that can be lent to small and
large businesses at a lower interest rate. Also, increased savings benefit individual savers by
providing a cushion so that they are not living at the edge of an "economic precipice." Id.
11. Thompson, supra note 10, at A19. A Merrill Lynch study found that "half of all Ameri-
can families have less than $1,000 net financial assets." Id.; see also Joseph S. Coyle, How to
Beat the Squeeze on the Middle Class, MoNEY, May 1, 1995, at 106, 112 (noting that Americans
save 4% of their after tax income, Germans save 12%, French save 12%, and Japanese save
15%).
12. Coyle, supra note 11, at 112-13.
13. The cohort of baby boomers is important in determining economic and social policy
because of its magnitude. Boomers range in age from 29 to 47 in 1993 [33 to 51 in 1997], and are
now in their prime working years, but will soon be entering retirement. RESEARCH Div., AMER-
ICAN Ass'N OF RETIRED PERSONS, AGING BABY BOOMERS: How SECURE Is THEIR ECONOMIC
FUTURE? 4 (1994) [hereinafter AARP REPORT].
14. Douglas Bemheim, Adequacy of Savings for Retirement and the Role of Economic Lit-
eracy, in RETIREMENT IN Ta 21ST CENTURY, READY OR NOT 73, 73-78 (Dallas L. Salisbury &
Nora S. Jones eds., 1994). There has been a steep decline in U.S. savings rates; empirical evi-
dence demonstrates that unless baby boomers undergo a dramatic change in their savings pat-
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In an effort to improve the individual savings rate, and at the same time
respond to charges that too much is being done for the well-off, last year
Congress passed legislation aimed at reducing taxes substantially for middle-
income Americans. 15 The Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act of 1995
was designed to provide $189 billion worth of tax relief to middle-income
taxpayers16 and included the American Dream Restoration Act. As a
method of encouraging individual savings among low- and middle-income
Americans, the American Dream Restoration Act created the American
Dream Savings Account ("ADSA") which is a more flexible retirement ac-
count than the traditional IRA.'
7
As part of the Budget Reconciliation Bill, the ADSA was vetoed by
President Clinton last year. However, because increased savings among mid-
dle-income Americans remains a number one priority of the President and
Congress, an individual retirement expansion proposal like the ADSA, if not
the ADSA in its exact form, is expected to be introduced again this year.18
Thus, it is useful to identify and analyze the goals of the ADSA in order to
anticipate and evaluate new legislation in the area of IRA expansion and
pension simplification. It is also important to understand the provisions of
the ADSA legislation in order to assess the potential impact of similar IRA
expansion proposals on existing pension policy.
terns, they will face a large reduction in their standard of living at retirement. Further, based on
a "best case" model, there is a risk that the baby boomer generation will not enjoy the same
standard of living as their parents during retirement. Id. But see AARP REPORT. supra note 13,
at 20 (claiming that baby boomers may not be able to maintain their working life standards in
retirement but may be better off than their parents will be in retirement).
15. Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act, H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Con-
gress passed H.R. 1215 on April 5, 1995. See Cheryl Wetzstein, House Approves GOP Tax-Cut
Plan, 246-188 Passage of "Crown Jewel" Completes "Contract," WASH. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at
Al.
16. The figure of $189 billion is frequently cited in literature concerning the House's tax bill.
See, e.g., Wetzstein, supra note 15, at Al. The figure of $189 billion is an estimate of the de-
crease in federal revenues that will occur over the five-year budget horizon, between 1995 and
2000, because of the Tax Fairness and Deficit Reduction Act's changes in the tax law. See JoirNT
COMM. ON TAXATION, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE TAX PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN
THE "CONTRACT wrrH AMERICA" (1995), reprinted in BNA, DAILY TAX REPORT (Feb. 2, 1995).
It must be noted that there has been criticism of the potential exponential loss in revenue after
the initial five-year budget period. See, e.g., ALBERT J. DAVIS, BUDGET IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CONTRACT wrrH AMERICA TAX CUTS (1995) (noting that in period between years 2000 and
2005, U.S. Treasury Department estimates that revenue losses will increase to $452 billion, and
that this will seriously impact efforts to balance the budget). There has also been much debate
concerning whether the tax provisions actually will benefit the middle class. See, e.g., 141 CONG.
REC. H4213 to H4264 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (debating effects of Tax Fairness-Deficit Reduc-
tion Act on middle-income families). However, while most of the argument centers on whether
the benefits will go primarily to the wealthy or to the middle class, few bother to define middle
class. The general assumption is that a household income level between $30,000 and $75,000 is
middle income. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S9356 to S9363 (daily ed. June 29, 1995) (debate
between Sen. Murray and Sen. Dodd on Budget Conference Report).
17. H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6103 (1995).
18. Pensions, Outlook Uncertain for Pension Measures in Vetoed Reconciliation, Bill Berg
Says, 1996 Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA), at A-11 (Jan. 18, 1996).
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Accordingly, this Article describes and critiques the objectives of the
ADSA. This Article then analyzes the potential social and economic effects
of accomplishing the identified goals of the ADSA. Finally, this Article will
conclude that the shift in pension policy made manifest by the ADSA, and
other similar savings proposals, has potentially dramatic implications for fu-
ture retirement savings among middle- and low-income Americans.
THE ADSA-AN EXPANDED IRA
A. IRA Expansion
Although recently IRA expansion proposals have received a great deal
of attention, expanding the IRA is not a new concept. 19 Over the last twenty
years, IRAs have gone from being more restrictive to less restrictive, and
back to more restrictive, in efforts to stimulate retirement saving equitably.
20
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")
was enacted, IRAs were limited to workers not covered by employer-spon-
sored plans. At that time, however, advocates for IRA expansion argued
that because all workers needed supplemental retirement savings, all workers
should have access to IRAs.2 1 In 1981, in response to this concern, Congress
expanded the use of IRAs and allowed all wage earners to establish these
accounts. At the same time, Congress raised the maximum contribution
amount to the lesser of $2,000 or 100% of compensation. 22 These two
changes caused the number of IRA contributors to more than triple, and the
amount of IRA contributions to escalate five-fold in the early 1980s.
23
19. See, e.g., Vivian Marino, This Could Be the Year of the IRA, Assoc. Press, Feb. 28, 1995,
available in 1995 WL 4364689 (noting trend in making IRAs less restrictive).
20. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), created IRAs. The Economic Recovery
Tax of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.), greatly expanded the availability of IRAs by allowing deductible contributions by indi-
viduals already covered by a qualified plan. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), curtailed the availability
of IRAs by imposing income limits on the deductibility of IRA contributions.
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 807, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (1974) (comparing original IRA
proposal submitted by Nixon administration with IRA proposal adopted by ERISA, and noting
that administration's proposal was broader because it allowed employees covered by employer
plans with low benefit levels to establish IRAs) (statement of Rep. Broyhill); see also JAMES R.
STOREY, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT AccoUNT ISSUES AND SAVINGS AccouNT PROPOSALS 1
(Cong. Res. Serv. Issue Brief No. IB89085, 1995). Storey argues that workers covered by an
employer sponsored plan also need supplemental income for retirement. Id. Also, even though
an employee may be covered by a pension, that does not mean the employer will receive benefits
under the plan since a certain number of years of employment must pass for the benefits to be
vested, and thereby legally enforceable. Id.
22. I.R.C. §§ 219(b)(1), 408(o) (1996).
23. STOREY, supra note 21, at 2. The number of participants went from 3.4 million tax filers
in 1981 to 12 million in 1982. Id. The number of contributions climbed from $4.8 billion in 1981
to $28.3 billion in 1982. Id. Some of the increase can be attributed to advertising and other
active promotional tactics. Id. at 2-3.
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The IRA's popularity abruptly ended, however, when the Tax Reform
Act of 1986 became law.24 Congress effectively reduced the tax benefits de-
rived from IRA contributions by lowering individual marginal tax rates.
25
Additionally, in the same Act, Congress restricted the deductibility of IRA
contributions to workers not covered by employer-sponsored plans or work-
ers who met certain income tests.
26
Congress made the 1986 changes because it determined that the ex-
panded availability of IRAs had no discernible impact on aggregate personal
savings levels.27 Congress also made the changes because statistical studies
indicated that it was primarily wealthier taxpayers, who presumably would
have saved adequately for retirement without savings incentives, who partici-
pated in IRA programs.28 Notwithstanding the findings and conclusions re-
sponsible for the 1986 limitations on the deductibility of IRA contributions,
however, last year Congress passed new ADSA legislation that would have
restored the benefits taken away from IRAs by the Tax Reform Act of
1986.29
24. Id. at tbl. 1. In 1986, 15.5 million taxpayers claimed an IRA deduction. In 1987, when
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 came into effect, 7.3 million taxpayers claimed an IRA deduction.
Id.
25. In the early 1980s, the effect of the diminished incentive was particularly acute for tax
returns reporting adjusted gross income over $50,000. Id. at 4-5.
In 1985, about 1 in 12 tax returns with AGI between $10,000 and $20,000 reported IRA
contributions, while 58% of returns with AGI over $50,000 reported them. In 1987,
IRA contributions fell to 5% of the $10,090-$20,000 income group and 8% of the over-
$50,000 group.
Id. at 5.
26. All taxpayers who contribute to IRAs, even if they cannot claim a deduction, enjoy the
tax-free build-up of their investment earnings. Limiting the ability to deduct an IRA contribu-
tion was done in an effort to widen the income tax base to help offset the lowering of the margi-
nal tax rates. Id.; see Marino, supra note 19. For joint tax fiing units with one earner, the
spousal IRA contribution limit is a combined $2,250. I.R.C. § 219(c) (1996). A two-wage-earn-
ing couple in which one spouse has minimal earnings can elect to be taxed as a one-earner
couple, and be subject to the $2,250 limit. Id. § 219(c)(1)(B)(ii). Two-wage-earner couples may
contribute up to $4,000. Id. § 219(b).
27. STOREY, supra note 21, at 6 (concluding from research and prior experience with uni-
versal deductibility that effects of IRAs on savings are modest at best and any new savings
flowing into IRAs may well have materialized without IRAs).
28. See id. at 5-6 (discussing disproportionate use of IRAs among wealthier taxpayers);
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 7, at 16-17.
29. See Marino, supra note 19 (discussing action taken by congress to restore benefits elimi-
nated under Tax Reform Act of 1986). The White House Middle Class Bill of Rights would have
expanded the income threshold for full IRA deductions to $50,000 for individuals and $80,000
for families. It would have allowed tax-free access for college, first-time home purchases, medi-
cal emergencies and long-term unemployment. Similarly, the Senate's Roth-Breaux Super IRA
would have restored full deductibility to everyone regardless of income and allowed the same




Consistent with the treatment of traditional IRAs, investment earnings
in the ADSA would accrue tax-free subject to certain conditions. Under
traditional IRA rules, deductible contributions are available only to taxpay-
ers not covered by employer sponsored retirement plans, or taxpayers whose
annual compensations do not exceed minimum income levels. All distribu-
tions from traditional IRAs are taxed upon receipt.30 In contrast, contribu-
tions to an ADSA would be non-deductible, and all distributions from an
ADSA occurring after age 59/2 would be tax exempt. 31 Distributions prior to
age 59 1h from an ADSA open for at least five years also would be tax ex-
empt, provided that the funds were used for the purchase of a first-time
home, educational expenses, or medical expenses. 32 Distributions from an
ADSA prior to age 591h for non-qualified purchases would be subject to an
early distribution excise tax.33 Additionally, the ADSA legislation would in-
crease the $250 IRA contribution limit for nonworking spouses to $2,000.
By establishing a new IRA that does not incorporate the 1986 restric-
tions on deductibility, proponents of the ADSA are attempting to recreate
the level of popularity that IRAs enjoyed in the early 1980s. By extending
the flexibility of IRA usage beyond that of the pre-1986 period, proponents
are hoping to attract even greater numbers of low- and middle-income savers
than in the early 1980s.34 ADSA supporters believe that individuals ordina-
rily reluctant to save in traditional retirement savings arrangements for fear
of losing access to their funds would be encouraged to save in the more flexi-
ble ADSAs.35 However, the use of retirement funds for non-retirement
purchases redefines established pension policy by shifting the focus away
from an exclusive retirement saving goal toward a more general personal sav-
ings goal. As a result, the expanded IRA raises numerous equity and social
concerns.
36
Contributions to an ADSA would not affect a taxpayer's eligibility to
make contributions to other saving arrangements, including traditional
30. To qualify for a full deduction of $2,000, an individual must satisfy one of two condi-
tions: (1) the individual, or her spouse, is not covered by an employer sponsored plan, or (2) the
total adjusted income is less than $40,000 for a taxpayer filing a joint return, or less than $25,000
for a single taxpayer. I.R.C. § 219(g)(1)-(3) (1996).
31. H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6103 (1995) (proposed addition to I.R.C. § 408A, at
§§ 408A(c)(1), (d)(2)(A)(i)).
32. Id. (proposing additions to I.R.C. § 408A, at §§ 408A(d)(2)(B), 408A(e)).
33. Id. (proposing additions to I.R.C. § 408A, at § 408A(d)(1)(B)).
34. See OFFICE OF THE HOUSE MAJoRITY LEADER, H.R. 1215: Tim TAX FAIRNESS AND
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT: FACTS, FIGURES AND SOURCES FOR THE TAX BILL DEBATE, H.R.
Doc. No. 95-3572, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-17 (1995) [hereinafter TAX BILL DEBATE]. See
generally Hearings on the Contract with America Before the House Committee on Ways and
Means, H.R. Doc. No. 95-1658, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
35. See TAX BILL DEBATE, supra note 34, at 13-15.
36. See Gene Epstein, The Coming Changes in IRAs Will Be Popular, But They Won't Make
Americans Save More, BARRO'S, Jan. 16, 1995, at 51, 51 (noting that purpose of IRAs is to
provide savings incentive).
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IRAs.37 Provisions of the ADSA legislation would allow all wage earners to
contribute to ADSAs regardless of income, or employer-sponsored plan par-
ticipation status.38 For an interim period, 39 ADSAs would accept penalty-
free rollovers from existing IRAs. At the time of such transfers, an income
tax would be assessed against the rolled-over amounts.4n Future earnings on
rolled-over amounts would accrue tax free and distributions from ADSAs
resulting from the rolled-over amounts would be subject to the ADSA distri-
bution rules.
Removing the 1986 restrictions on the tax deferred status of IRAs would
most likely increase contributions to the more flexible IRAs. However, the
ADSA's flexible distribution rules and its acceptance of IRA roll-overs radi-
cally change federal pension policy which historically has been aimed at en-
couraging individuals who ordinarily could not save for retirement to do so.
Furthermore, the ADSA's expansion of the available uses for retirement sav-
ings also jeopardizes the retirement security of middle- and low-income
Americans because it creates disincentives for them to save adequately for
retirement, by permitting the use of retirement funds for current consump-
tion items. Consequently, it is unlikely that expansive distribution provisions
like those contained in the ADSA legislation would significantly benefit low-
and middle-income taxpayers or bring about the intended result of increasing
their aggregate personal savings.
C. Shift in Pension Policy
The United States savings rate is one of the lowest in the developed
world.41 However, more Americans save for retirement than for any other
saving goal.42 It is the relative popularity of retirement saving in general that
has led to the recent interest in using traditional retirement vehicles to en-
courage tax-preferred saving for other purposes, such as college education,
first-home purchases, and medical emergencies.
The underlying reason for the preferential tax treatment of retirement
saving plans, including IRAs, is to encourage retirement saving, which in turn
increases economic security in old age. In order to ensure that individuals
37. TAX BILL DEBATE, supra note 34, at 13-15.
38. H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6103 (1995) (proposing addition to I.R.C. § 408A, at
§ 408A(c)(2)). It is also proposed to increase the $250 IRA contribution limit for nonworking
spouses to $2,000. Id. § 6104 (proposing amendment to I.R.C. § 219(c)). While individuals
could contribute up to $2,000 annually, married couples filing jointly could contribute up to
$4,000 to an ADSA.
39. Id. § 6103 (proposing addition to I.R.C. § 408A, at § 408A(c)(5)). Rollovers from ex-
isting IRAs would be accepted by ADSAs from December 31, 1996, through January 1, 1998.
Id.
40. Id. (proposing addition to I.R.C. § 408A, at § 408A(d)(3)). The tax would be assessed
ratably over a four year period starting with the taxable year the rollover was made. Id.
41. STEvE FARKAS & JEAN JOHNSON, PROMISES TO KEEP: How LEADERS AND THE PUBUC
RESPOND TO SAVING AND RETIREMENT 8 (Public Agenda & Employee Benefit Res. Inst. eds.,
1994).
42. Id. at 9. The amount saved is very low. Id.
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actually use their retirement funds for retirement purposes, Congress im-
poses restrictions on the use of retirement savings. Non-retirement use of
retirement funds is discouraged by a 10% excise tax on all early distributions
from tax-favored retirement saving arrangements, unless such distributions
are made on account of death or disability.
43
Historically, IRAs also have been viewed exclusively for the purpose of
retirement saving. Therefore, all early distributions from IRAs are also sub-
ject to the early distribution excise tax. Notwithstanding the penalty for early
withdrawal, however, many individuals continue to take early distributions
from their IRAs. Because early distributions enable individuals to spend re-
tirement funds on current consumption, some policymakers have argued that
the early withdrawal penalty should be higher to deter individuals from using
their retirement assets for non-retirement purposes." While some commen-
tators have expressed concern about early distributions, other commentators
have speculated that the penalties for such distributions are too severe. They
maintain that the reason many who are eligible to utilize tax-deferred IRAs
choose not to is because they are hesitant to put savings in vehicles that place
their assets beyond their reach, for fear that they will need the funds before
retirement. 4
5
The more flexible withdrawal rules of the ADSA address the latter con-
cern by allowing penalty-free access to retirement funds after five years for
qualified expenditures. The change in rules not only expands the concept of
the private pension system, but also de-emphasizes the importance of retire-
ment saving. Thus, the more flexible distribution rules effectively create a
new tax-subsidy for qualified current consumption items.
Regardless of the restrictions placed on the non-retirement uses of the
ADSA, if retirement funds are spent for current consumption they will not
be available for retirement.46 The ADSA legislation, therefore, violates
Congressional intent and fundamental pension policy by allowing individuals
to use retirement funds for purposes other than retirement security.47 As a
consequence, if the ADSA or another flexible retirement saving proposal be-
comes law, millions of Americans who previously were encouraged to save
for retirement through the favorable tax treatment of retirement arrange-
ments, and discouraged from using those funds for current consumption by
the 10% excise tax on early withdrawals, could choose freely to divert their
retirement savings to non-retirement uses.
Because wealthy Americans have sufficient discretionary income to save
adequately for retirement, they need no additional incentives to save for this
43. I.R.C. § 72(t) (1996); LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 348.
44. STOREY, supra note 21, at 6. New legislation now allows withdrawals from IRAs for
certain medical expenses without assigning any penalty. See I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(13) (as amended
by P.L. No. 104-191).
45. Kathy S. Murray & Paul Yakoboski, Congress Considers ERA Expansion, EBRI NoTEs
(Employee Benefit Res. Inst., Wash. D.C.), Apr. 1995, at 1, 3.
46. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 342.
47. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 728-29 (1985).
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goal. Thus, the brunt of the shift from existing retirement income policy,
which focuses primarily on financial security during old age, to a retirement
savings policy which allows earlier access to the funds for current consump-
tion, would be borne disproportionately by middle- and low-income
Americans.
D. Dis-savings for Retirement
ADSAs would be popular because they would provide penalty-free ac-
cess to tax-subsidized retirement funds before retirement. 48 However, it is
doubtful that the availability of ADSAs would result in an overall net in-
crease in savings for individual taxpayers, because any projected increase in
ADSA savings would likely be accomplished at the expense of traditional
retirement savings. This is particularly true for the interim period that the
ADSA would permit the transfer of funds from existing IRAs to ADSAs.
49
During this period, all prior contributions made to traditional IRAs, includ-
ing lump sum distributions from employment based pension plans50 previ-
ously rolled over into traditional IRAs, would be eligible for penalty-free
transfer to ADSAs.
51
Rolled-over contributions represent significant amounts of retirement
savings.52 From 1987 through 1990, for example, taxpayers made $11.2 mil-
lion in roll-over contributions to traditional IRAs.53 During the same period,
total IRA contributions reached $220 billion. 54 Thus, if the roll-over feature
of the ADSA legislation ever becomes law, after five years as much as $220
billion of current IRA retirement funds would be available penalty-free for
non-retirement purposes. Therefore, not only would the ADSA redefine fu-
ture pension policy, but it potentially would undermine the success of the
existing retirement program by allowing early withdrawals of funds currently
earmarked for retirement for non-retirement purposes.
55
Proponents of the ADSA are likely to argue that spending for the per-
mitted purposes is not inconsistent with retirement policy and, in fact, en-
48. Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 3.
49. Although the legislation treated the transfer of funds from an existing IRA to an ADSA
as a taxable event, these funds would not have been subject to the I.R.C. § 72(t) penalty tax.
H.R. 1215, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 6103 (1995) (proposing addition to I.R.C. § 408A, at
§ 408A(d)(1)).
50. The taxation of certain distributions from qualified plans is deferred if the funds are
transferred to an IRA, or to another qualified plan, within 60 days after receipt of the funds.
I.R.C. § 402(c) (1996).
51. Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 2.
52. Id. at 4. See also Prepared Testimony of Martin Jaffe, C.F.P. , President, International
Ass'n for Financial Planning (IAFP) Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, Jan. 31,
1995 [hereinafter Jaffe Testimony].
53. Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 4; see also PAUL YAKOBOsri, RETIREMENT
PROGRAM LUMP-SuM DISTRIBUTIONS: HUNDREDS OF BILLIONS IN HIDDEN PENSION INCOME
(Employee Benefit Res. Inst. Brief No. 146, 1994).
54. See YAKOBOSKI, supra note 53.
55. STOREY, supra note 21, at 8.
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hances future retirement income security.56 In other words, they will
maintain that purchasing a first home, educating children, and saving for
medical expenses are socially desirable goals consistent with pension policy
and public interest. 57 However, for individuals who use different types of
savings vehicles for different savings goals, the limitations placed on the use
of ADSA funds could prove meaningless, if taxpayers shift their accumulated
savings from traditional retirement saving arrangements to the more flexible
ADSA.
The following example illustrates this point. Assume that, some years
ago, a taxpayer desired to save for retirement, pay for a child's education,
and purchase a new sports car. However, having limited resources, the tax-
payer was forced to abandon one of the saving goals. The taxpayer decided to
forgo the sports car and save for college tuition and retirement through mu-
tual funds and traditional IRAs, respectively.
Further assume that the ADSA becomes law and the taxpayer rolls over
the entire IRA balance into an ADSA in order to have earlier access to the
funds. By the time the rollover occurs, the retirement fund has grown to a
level that may appear to be a comfortable amount for retirement.58 How-
ever, the appearance of adequate savings may be misleading, given the uncer-
tainty of future inflation, anticipated income increases, and expected
investment performance. Several years later the taxpayer's child enters col-
lege and tuition becomes due. Notwithstanding years of sacrificing to save
for retirement security, the taxpayer decides to take a tax-free distribution
from the ADSA to pay for the child's tuition because the taxpayer is unaware
that the retirement fund may be insufficient. As a result of this decision, the
funds in the mutual fund are now available to purchase the new sports car
which the taxpayer initially desired.
By shifting saving goals and saving instruments, the taxpayer is indirectly
able to use the ADSA funds, which have received tax-free earnings over sev-
eral years,5 9 to purchase a new sports car. Most people would agree that the
purchase of the sports car would not be consistent with retirement income
security. Yet the transfer of traditional IRA funds to the ADSA facilitated
the purchase. Absent the ADSA, the sports car purchase would not have
been possible for the taxpayer without either incurring a substantial penalty
60
or forgoing the child's education. Thus, by playing a game of "musical
funds," individuals could gain early, penalty-free access to their retirement
funds for a first home, education, or a medical emergency, freeing up money
that otherwise would have been saved for one of the qualified purchases to
56. See Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 5.
57. See id.
58. See STEPHEN B. COHEN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH
198-99 (1989).
59. See supra notes 31-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of how ADSAs provide
tax-free earnings.
60. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of the disadvantages of
IRAs for saving purposes.
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be spent on unqualified uses.61 Although the unqualified purchases are
likely to be inconsistent with retirement security, the transfer of funds from
traditional retirement vehicles could nevertheless, as this example illustrates,
make such purchases possible.
E. Adverse Effect on Employer Sponsored 401(k) Plans
In addition to its negative impact on the retirement savings program in
general, the ADSA, and similar flexible IRA proposals, threaten the viability
of certain employer-sponsored retirement savings arrangements in which the
employee is given an option to make elective contributions from current
wages. These plans are known as 401(k) plans. Under existing law, there is
general consistency in the withdrawal rules for 401(k) plans and IRAs.
62
Therefore, the ADSA's more flexible distribution rules would give the
ADSA a competitive advantage over employer sponsored elective contribu-
tion plans. This situation ultimately could cause contributions to 401(k) plans
to decline, particularly among low-paid individuals who are more likely to
value the ADSA's early access feature.63
Most employers already have difficulty persuading lower-paid employ-
ees to contribute to elective contribution plans.64 Participation among lower
paid employees is necessary to enable qualified plans to meet ERISA's non-
discrimination tests. 65 Failure to meet the nondiscrimination standards re-
sults in a plan losing its preferential tax status.66 Thus, some employers may
refrain from establishing or maintaining 401(k) plans, assuming that low-in-
come employees would prefer saving in more flexible ADSAs. This decision
could prove problematic for future retirees because it is generally believed
that 401(k) plans are more generous and offer greater retirement security
than IRAs.6
7
For example, 401(k) plans often have employer matching features as a
way of encouraging participation. Under such options the employer matches
a given percentage of every dollar of pay contributed by the employee to the
401(k) plan;68 accordingly, plan participants receive a greater return from
their investments than they would if they saved in an IRA type vehicle.
61. See Regina T. Jefferson, The American Dream Savings Account. Is It a Dream or a
Nightmare?, in TAXING AMERICA (Karen B. Brown & Mary L. Fellows eds., 1996).
62. The 10% penalty tax applies to both. I.R.C. § 72(t) (1996).
63. Christine Philip & Vineeta Anand, 401(k)s Safe from New Competition, PENSIONS &
INV., Mar. 20, 1995, at 3.
64. Gordon Williams, Pension Piranhas, FIN. WORLD, May 23, 1995, at 81.
65. See I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(4)-(5) (1996) (detailing non-discrimination requirements); see also
id. § 411.
66. Id. § 401(a). One method of avoiding disqualification is for the employer to make con-
tributions on behalf of all non-highly compensated employees. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note
6, at 254; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-l(b)(5) (as amended in 1993) (stating that qualified
nonelective contributions must satisfy nondiscrimination rules); Williams, supra note 64, at 81.
67. Philip & Anand, supra note 63, at 3.
68. LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 6, at 252-53. Matching contributions must satisfy spe-
cial nondiscrimination rules. Id. at 253; see I.R.C. § 401(m) (1996).
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More importantly, however, employer sponsored plans typically are managed
by professionals who are more likely to have the expertise to use investment
strategies that achieve maximum investment performance. 69 In contrast, the
ADSA, like the traditional IRA, would require that investment decisions be
made by individual ADSA holders who may have little or no experience in
financial management.
70
F. IRAs Provide Little to Lower-Income Americans
The ADSA was marketed as part of a middle-income tax relief pack-
age.71 However, most of the direct benefits of the ADSA would go to upper-
income individuals.72 The most obvious reason the ADSA disproportion-
ately would benefit wealthier Americans is because of the tax system's pro-
gressive tax rate structure. The applicable tax rate increases as individuals
earn more income.73 Thus, the advantage of tax deferral increases as an indi-
vidual's marginal tax rate increases, making the incentive to save in a tax
deferred account greater for high-income taxpayers than for low-income
taxpayers.
Flexible retirement savings programs such as the ADSA raise other re-
lated concerns about the fairness and merits of a savings program based
solely on tax incentives. For example, giving preferential tax treatment to
first time home buyers adds to the large tax subsidy already given to home-
owners which results from the exclusion of imputed income and the deduct-
ibility of interest paid for qualified residential mortgages.74 Thus, the ADSA
would increase the disparate tax treatment between individuals who can af-
ford to own their homes and those who cannot.
75
Another reason wealthy Americans are likely to benefit more from
ADSA type legislation is that households already contributing to IRAs tend
to be wealthier than households that do not. 76 The primary reason given by
69. Philip & Anand, supra note 63, at 3; see also Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Invest-
ment Risk of Defined Contribution Plans (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
70. Some employer-sponsored plans, known as self-directed plans, do allow participants to
choose their own investments.
71. Clay Chandler, GOP Contractors' "Dream" Bill Has Deficit Hawks Losing Sleep,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1994, at A27 (describing American Dream Restoration Act).
72. Gary Belsky, Why Most of the Rich Will Get Richer, MONEY, May 1995, at 134, 134-36;
see also Chandler, supra note 71, at A27 (stating that Democrats argue Republican proposals
will provide windfall for higher income taxpayers).
73. Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code imposes a 15% tax on the first $22,100 for
unmarried individuals, and a rate of 28% on income between $22,100 and $53,500. Thus, for
example, if an unmarried individual with taxable income of $10,000 receives additional income
of $100, it would be taxed at 15%. Thus, a deduction of $100 results in a tax savings of $15 to the
taxpayer. If however, an individual has taxable income of $50,000, additional income of $100
would be taxed at 28%. Thus, a deduction of $100 results in a tax savings of $28.
74. STOREY, supra note 21, at 8; see I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(D) (1996) (allowing deduction for
interest on purchase of qualified residence).
75. See STOREY, supra note 21, at 8.
76. R. GLENN HUBBARD & JONATHAN S. SKINNER, Ti E'EacrvWNESS OF SAViNG INCEN-
nvEs: A REVIEW OF Tm EVmEN CE 17 (1995).
[Vol. 691462
TAX POLICY IMPACT OF FLEXIBLE IRAs
non-wealthy wage earners for failing to establish IRAs is lack of money. 77
More than 40% of low-income non-IRA-owners reveal that after meeting the
cost of their necessities and basic expenses, nothing is left to contribute to an
IRA.78 Seventy-four percent of households with income of less than $40,000
do not save at all because of inadequate income.79 Therefore, unless Ameri-
cans earn more in wages, they will continue to lack sufficient disposable in-
come to take advantage of the ADSA, or for that matter, any other savings
program.
To the extent that the increased contribution limits for expanded IRAs
are expected to increase total savings among low and middle-income individ-
uals, the legislation would have little effect. This prediction can be more fully
understood by looking at traditional IRA contribution patterns. In 1987,
only 5% of households earning between $10,000 and $20,000 made IRA con-
tributions. At that time, these households were eligible to make fully deduct-
ible contributions of $2,000 to their IRAs.80 Presumably, the low IRA
participation rate is attributable to low earnings rather than low contribution
limits.81 Thus, the fact that the ADSA raises the contribution level for single
wage earner couples from $2,250 to- $4,000 would have little or no effect on
couples who cannot afford to contribute $2,250 under current law. Similarly,
allowing all wage earners to make contributions up to the $2,000 limit, $4,000
for couples, regardless of income, would not motivate individuals who cur-
rently have insufficient disposable income to save.
Thus, the principal beneficiaries of the ADSA's increased contribution
limits would be those who already save and, therefore, require no additional
incentive to do so. Such individuals stand to benefit substantially from an
expanded IRA because they would be given a more tax-efficient method of
saving for education, first home purchases, and medical care expenses which
are activities for which there already exists preferential tax treatment.8s
G. Expanded IRAs May Not Be Effective In Increasing Overall Savings
If the objective of the ADSA legislation is to increase savings in general,
then a fair question to ask is whether taxpayers are likely to use ADSAs for
savings. 83 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that 73% of all tax-
77. RESEARCH DEP'T, INVESTMENT CO. INST., IRAs: TmE PEOPLE'S CHOICE 31 (1985).
78. Id.
79. FARKAS & JOHNSON, supra note 41, at 14.
80. STOREY, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that 8% of those earning over $50,000 made contri-
butions in spite of nondeductibility).
81. But see JoNrr Comm. ON TAXATION, supra note 7, at 52-55. Some observers suggest
that the heavy marketing of IRAs to the public in the mid-1980s was a large determinant of the
high IRA participation rates in the mid-1980s. Accordingly, tne decline in IRA contributions
after 1986, may be due, in part, to decreased IRA advertising after 1986. Id.
82. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 213(a) (1996) (providing deduction for medical expenses exceeding
7.5% of adjusted gross income); id. § 127(a) (1996) (providing exclusion of up to $5,250 for
educational assistance provided by employer); id. § 163(h) (1996) (allowing deduction for inter-
est on qualified residence).
83. Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 3.
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payers with earned income in 1991 were eligible for full tax deferral of IRA
contributions, and 9% were eligible for partial deferrals. However, only 2%
of the eligible population made contributions to IRAs in 1991.84 Further-
more, during the peak of IRA participation in the early 1980s, IRA contribu-
tions never accounted for more than 1% of disposable income. Therefore,
the IRA's history of limited participation suggests that it is very unlikely that
the ADSA would do much to improve personal savings in America.
One of the most controversial features of the ADSA is that it is back-
loaded.85 Taxpayers choosing an ADSA over a traditional IRA must be will-
ing to pay current taxes on funds not available to them in reliance on a future
tax benefit. If tax rates remain constant, back-loaded and front-loaded sav-
ings arrangements provide the same tax benefits. A numerical example can
illustrate this point.86 Assume that a couple invests $4,000 in retirement sav-
ing arrangements at a 5% rate of return. The couple's marginal tax rate is
28%, and they plan to retire in fifteen years. If the taxpayers choose to invest
in back-loaded ADSAs, they would pay an initial tax of $1,120, which leaves
$2,880 to invest. At the end of the fifteen-year-period their total balance
would be $5,988, and would be free from tax.
87
In contrast, if the couple invests $4,000 in front-loaded IRAs, they would
pay no taxes initially, leaving the entire $4,000 to invest at 5 %. At the end of
the fifteen-year-period their total balance would be $8,316. A 28% tax would
apply when the funds were distributed, leaving the couple again with $5,998
for their retirement.
88
If tax rates were expected to increase, the back-loaded feature would
encourage increased ADSA contributions because taxpayers would prefer
paying taxes determined under the lower tax rate structure. Conversely, if tax
rates were expected to decrease, taxpayers would find it more advantageous
to invest in traditional IRAs.89 Thus, the back-loaded feature of the ADSA
presents a calculated risk for prospective ADSA savers who may anticipate
having future lower marginal tax rates as a result of a rate change, or a de-
crease in income.
Even in the absence of concern about the possibility of marginal tax rate
changes, however, the back-loaded feature of the ADSA alone may render it
ineffective as a saving incentive. ADSAs may have less appeal than tradi-
tional IRAs simply because the ADSA does not immediately minimize a tax-
payer's tax liability. As discussed above, during the early 1980s the IRA
program was much more popular than it is today, particularly for middle-
84. See STOREY, supra note 21, at 2-3.
85. Chandler, supra note 71, at A27. Back-loaded refers to the fact that the taxpayer pays
taxes on the amount contributed initially, but receives a tax benefit at the end when the funds
are withdrawn tax-free. Id.
86. HUBBARD & SKINNER, supra note 76, at 12-13.
87. Chandler, supra note 71, at A27. Early withdrawal of funds for non-qualified purposes,
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income individuals. Once IRAs were restricted, however, and the tax de-
ductible feature was eliminated for most workers, many individuals discon-
tinued their contributions.90 Just as the elimination of the immediate
deduction contributed to the sharp decline in IRA participation in 1986, the
absence of an immediate deduction for ADSAs may significantly minimize
their investment appeal today. 91
An additional reason ADSAs may not have much appeal is the currently
low tax rates. IRAs were most popular before the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
when tax rates were substantially higher. Consequently, during this period
deductions were more valuable than they would be today to taxpayers with
higher marginal tax rates.
92
H. Administrative Difficulties and Adverse Budgetary Implications
The ADSA would introduce substantial administrative complexity. It
would be necessary to give taxpayers explanations about the differences in
front-loaded and back-loaded IRAs as well as the complicated definitions
and requirements for meeting the criteria for qualified expenditures. The
ADSA would also be administratively burdensome to taxpayers and the IRS
in efforts to account for and accurately measure the five-year holding period
necessary for tax-free distributions. Moreover, many taxpayers would have
both traditional IRAs and ADSAs, causing great confusion about the incon-
sistent distribution rules for the two types of accounts. As a result, taxpayers
would incur additional reporting requirements, and the Treasury would incur
additional costs for the administration of ADSAs and their enforcement.
Budgetary estimates indicate that if the ADSA had become law, not
only would there have been significant administrative difficulties, but there
also would have been substantial fiscal challenges.93 For the interim period
that ADSA legislation would have permitted rollovers from traditional
IRAs, the ADSA would have produced revenue because these transactions
would be subject to an income tax.94 The income tax would be paid on the
90. See Jaffe Testimony, supra note 52.
91. See, e.g., Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Toiling to Reduce Taxes in a Changing Environment,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995, at 11; Joir COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 7.
92. See supra note 73 for an explanation of the effect of a progressive marginal tax rate. On
the other hand, relatively low rates may encourage some taxpayers to invest in ADSAs and incur
current tax liability because the risk of higher tax rates in the future is greater. JoINrr COMM. ON
TAXATION, supra note 7.
93. Chandler, supra note 71, at A27 (stating that "many budget experts decry the IRA
provisions in the bill as a 'fiscal time bomb"').
94. Id. (stating that "converting old accounts and opening new ones would increase revenue
in the short term-Republicans project the accounts will generate $4.7 billion in the bill's first
five years"). The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that the American Dream Savings
Account would raise $2.2 billion over the first five years. See H. Jane Lehman, IRA Proposals
Could Aid First-Time Buyers: Congress Weighs Waiving Withdrawal Penalty, WASH. POST, Feb.
11, 1995, at El, E9. However, over the second five years, the committee estimates that the
ADSA will lose $23.9 billion. Id. The Treasury estimates that over the first five years, the
ADSA will raise closer to $5 billion and will lose $22.7 billion in revenues over the second five
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rolled-over amounts over a four-year period beginning with the taxable year
in which the transfer was made.95 Estimates from the Joint Committee on
Taxation predicted that $2 to $5 billion would be raised in the first five years
of the ADSA program.96 However, after five years, as individuals became
eligible for the tax-free distributions of the investment earnings on their con-
tributions, estimates show that the ADSA would have reduced revenue by
approximately $24 billion.97 Thus, the ADSA would be expected to cause a
substantial net revenue loss in its first ten years.
98
Therefore, in the long run, rather than increasing national savings, the
ADSA would increase the federal deficit. Moreover, as taxpayers would
continue to withdraw their funds tax-free from their ADSAs, the cost of the
program would grow exponentially.
CONCLUSION
The ADSA is an example of an expansive IRA proposal. It represents a
dramatic movement away from existing pension policy which provides
greater incentives to save for retirement security than for current consump-
tion. This shift in policy potentially has serious implications for future retire-
ment income saving. In particular, to the extent that the ADSA and other
flexible IRA proposals would permit penalty-free access for certain non-re-
tirement expenditures, the shift discourages future retirement saving among
middle- and low-income individuals who have previously been encouraged to
save for retirement through existing retirement saving incentive programs.
Additionally, for the interim period that the ADSA would accept roll-
overs from traditional IRAs, many individuals would be encouraged to re-
move funds from their traditional IRAs and place them in the more flexible
accounts in order to have earlier access for non-retirement purposes. As a
result of these transfers, increased contributions to ADSAs would not repre-
sent additional personal savings at all. Instead, this activity would represent
an erosion of existing retirement savings. Therefore, the ADSA would very
likely be unsuccessful at accomplishing its goal of increasing aggregate per-
sonal savings among non-wealthy Americans. For these reasons, an ex-
panded IRA program could prove to be fiscally irresponsible and
economically unsound to the extent that it widens the current deficit without
increasing aggregate personal savings or providing tax relief to non-wealthy
Americans. 99
years. Alissa J. Rubin, Tax Cuts, 10 Years down the Road, 53 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 345 (Feb. 4,
1995).
95. Murray & Yakoboski, supra note 45, at 2.
96. JoIr COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 7; see also Lehman, supra note 94, at E9.
97. Chandler, supra note 71, at A27.
98. Lehman, supra note 94, at E9.
99. H.R. REP. No. 184, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 21, 1995).
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